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OMB Circular A-76 provides guidance for estimating the cost of commercial
activities that are candidates for outsourcing. The benefits of outsourcing commercial
activities are greater efficiency, better service, and reduced costs. However, DOD has
experienced modest success outsourcing its commercial activities. This study exams DOD's
limited success outsourcing commercial activities. Research was conducted by: studying
the requirements of OMB Circular A-76; conducting interviews with comptrollers, base
commanders, and human resources personnel; reviewing pertinent United States Codes and
Codes of Federal Regulations; and reviewing court rulings establishing legal precedence.
Outsourcing has experienced limited success due to DOD's reluctance to rely on inorganic
assets, resistance from Congress and the executive branch, public-employeeunion criticism,
improper incentives for Base Commanders, prohibitive short term costs, and cumbersome
A-76 requirements. To realize the benefits of outsourcing DOD must: fund programs that
encourage volunteer separation, provide training for employees who complete the A-76,
provide activities incentives to complete the process, fund outsourcing's short term costs,
fund staffs trained to handle outsourcing's human resources issues, seek modification of
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The Navy's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal 1 998 included
a wedge projecting over $3 billion in savings from outsourcing competition. In a
recent message, the Chief ofNaval Operations (CNO) directed that activities must
initiate outsourcingcompetition to meet this goal. This effort continues a cost savings
effort begun with the Defense Management Review of 1 990. This thesis will discuss
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) process of contracting out these
services, which is established by Circular A-76, define outsourcing's short-term cost,
and discuss legal and Equal Employment Opportunity implications. This chapter will
discuss the history of contracting out.
B. BACKGROUND
Outsourcing, also known as privatization or contracting out, is receiving a lot
ofthe government's attention. The word privatization did not exist until it appeared
in the Webster's dictionary in 1983. [Ref. l:p. 2] Webster defines privatization as
the process of changing from public to private control or ownership. This change or
threat of change from public to private control can lead to greater efficiency and cost
reductions. Regardless of political affiliation, many public officials speculate that
privatization can help them balance the budget without increasing taxes or decreasing
services. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has indicated that he will push for
increased procurement to modernize the Armed Forces. With the shrinking
discretionary federal budget, the Department of Defense (DOD) will need to be
innovative in financing the modernization effort or be forced to take it out of existing
programs. Proposals have been floated to reduce the number of personnel and/or
reduce infrastructure. Service Chiefs are already jockeying for position to protect
1
what they have from the budget knife. The Army could lose 50,000 people, the Navy
20,000, and the Air Force 10,000. These kinds of numbers have the Service Chiefs
attention and are forcing them to take a look at outsourcing government activities.
There are two types of activities performed by the government; commercial
activities and inherently governmental activities. OMB defines a commercial activity
as "the process resulting in a product or service that is or could be obtained from a
private sector source." Examples of commercial activities are janitorial services,
maintenance services, grounds keeping, and supply and warehousing. OMB defines
an inherently governmental activity as "one that is so intimately related to the exercise
of the public interest as to mandate performance by federal employees. These
functions include those activities that require either the exercise of discretion in
applying Government authority or the making of value judgements in making
decisions for the government." [Ref. 2:p. 3] Only commercial activities are
candidates for outsourcing.
Numerous examples can be cited of increased efficiency and reduced cost
when comparing private and public service's cost of performing commercial
activities. In his statement to the House Committee on the Budget, Wisconsin
Congressman Scott Klug discussed the benefits of privatizing the Naval Petroleum
Reserve at Elk Hill in Southern California. He stated, "Of the eighty percent of the
petroleum reserve now run by the federal government, Bechtel has an average of
seventy workers per one hundred wells. Chevron, which has fields literally right next
door, has an average of twelve workers per one hundred wells." [Ref. 3:p. 3]
DOD has had success with privatization. At Vance Air Force Base, about one
thousand employees of Northrop Aircraft Service perform jobs for which other
comparable Air Force bases utilize twice the number of military and government
workers. In the aircraft-maintenancehangars at Vance, where T-37 and T-38 trainer
jets are overhauled, four-man crews are cross-utilized to play three or more roles;
other bases typicallyperform these roles with separate teams ofhydraulic, engine, and
electrical specialists, often twelve in all. Vance regularly has a lower percentage of
its planes grounded for maintenance than these other bases, meaning that a higher
quality of service is being provided at less cost. In the supply, transportation, and
procurement building, a twenty-two year retired veteran of the Air Force directs a
single department that other bases operate as three departments. Under him, about
one hundred employees operate base-supply and fuels functions that bases elsewhere
perform with two hundred and twenty-five people.... All over the base, Northrop uses
working supervisors and multi skilled workers.... Nearly $9 million annually is saved
-22 % below the cost at comparable bases- by using a private contractor at Vance.
[Ref. 4:pp. 223-224]
What is different between the civilian operations at the Elk Hill Naval
Petroleum reserve and Vance Air Force Base, and comparable operations performed
by the government? The difference is simple. Competition and profit incentives are
much stronger in the private sector than any government incentive program. For
management and workers, incentives do not encourage the same results from private
sector and government workers. In the private sector, management's primary
objective/incentive is profit. This leads to more innovative thinking and efficiencies
that drive down cost and increase profits. The private sector workers have incentives
and opportunities not offered to a government worker.
The Pentagon and the Office ofManagement and Budget (OMB) acknowledge
the success at Vance and refer to it as, "the most cost-effective base in the U.S. Air
Force." [Ref. 4:p. 224] However, DOD has few examples of services contracted out
to the private sector. This leads to the question of, "Why?" There are five readily
identifiable reasons:
1.
DOD reluctance to rely on inorganic assets.
2. Resistance from Congress, the executive branch and the bureaucracy.
3. Public-employee union criticism.
4. Improper incentives for Base Commanders.
5. Prohibitive short term costs.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
Based on data acquired while closing Naval Air Station (NAS) Alameda and
Naval Station (NS) Oakland, what separation alternatives can Base Commanders
expect separating civilian employees to take and what short term costs are associated
with each?
2. Secondary Research Question
a. How can activities reduce short term costs?
b. What are the legal implications of a RIF?
c. What are the impacts of a RIF on Human Resource issues?
d. What are an activity's obligations to outsourced employees?
D. METHODOLOGY
The objectives of this thesis are to review current contracting out policies,
evaluate the results of those policies, and determine the potential short term costs
associated with contracting out. This will be accomplished by reviewing:
• Published academic research papers.
Published GAO and OMB reports.
References, publications, and electronic media available at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) and the University of California at Santa
Cruz libraries.
Internet web-sites and home pages (DOD, Executive Branch,
commercial, and academic).
Interviews with NPS faculty and staff (Public Works Officer (PWO),
Human Resources Officer (HRO), and current and former Comptrollers
at NAS Alameda and FISC Oakland.
E. BENEFITS OF STUDY
During the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process and personnel
reductions of the past several years, Base Commanders have not had guidance to
follow for planning and carrying out reductions, or any data to help estimate costs
associated with personnel reductions. This study will provide a template for
estimating personnel reduction costs, a brief discussion of alternative separation
methods for personnel reductions, and a list of lessons learned by commanders and
comptrollers of activities faced with personnel reductions.

II. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET CIRCULAR A-76
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
The Federal government's contracting out policies began during the
Eisenhower administration. In 1955, President Eisenhower signed a historic
presidential directive specifying that "the federal government will not start or carry
on any commercial activity to provide a service or product for its own use if such a
product or service can be procured from private enterprise." Though well-
intentioned, this policy statement was replaced in 1966 by OMB Circular A-76. [Ref.
1 :p. 65] This chapter will describe OMB Circular A-76, review the cost generation
process, analyze cost comparison criteria, discuss legislation affecting the circular,
and explore the cost estimating process. Also discussed is the effect legislation has
on the number of cost estimates undertaken by DOD.
B. BACKGROUND
In its 1991 report to the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) reported on OMB Circular A-76. The following summary
of this report provides background and information on the policy of federal agency's
job costing estimation.
OMB Circular A-76 established the policy guiding federal agencies in
determining the most economical way to carry out their commercial
activities. The circular requires agencies to review their commercial
activities to determine whether it is more economical to retain the work
in-house or to contract it out to the private sector. This review consists
of the following major segments:
Preparation of a performance work statement that, among other
things, describes the work required and serves as the basis for
contractor bids; and
A management study containing the government's estimate of
the lowest number and types of employees required to do the
functions described in the work statement-generally referred to
as the "most efficient organization" (MEO) that, along with
other estimated costs associatedwith in-house performance, will
allow an agency to develop a total cost for in house
performance. [Ref. 5:pp. 1-2]
The agency compares the estimated in-house cost with private-sector
contractor bids. The A-76 requires the awarding of a contract to the contractor who
is judged by the agency to be most capable of meeting all the government's quality,
timeliness, and quantity standards, provided that (1) the total cost of the contract
performance is less than the in-house bid, and (2) the margin of difference between
the total cost of the contract performance and the in-house bid exceeds 10 percent of
the personnel costs or $10 million over the performance period of the in-house bid.
When a contract is awarded, the government work force is to be reassigned.
If the above conditions are not met , the activity is to be retained in-house and
completed by the government civilian workers. Affected parties can file an appeal as
a safeguard to help ensure that the decision is equitable and in accordance A-76
procedures.
C. GENERATING A COST COMPARISON
Figure 2. 1 shows the generic A-76 Cost Comparison form used for comparing
in-house performance and contracting costs for commercial activities. Figure 2.2 is
the streamlined A-76 cost comparison form used for commercial activities with sixty-
five full time equivalents (FTE) or less.
The Generic A-76 Cost Comparison Form (GCCF)
In-House vs. Contract or ISSA Performance
1st 2nd
Performance Period





2. Material and Supply








10. One Time Conversion
1 1
.
Gain on Assets ( ) ( ) (
12. Federal Income Taxes ( ) ( ) (




14. Minimum Conversion Differential
15. Adjusted Total Cost of In-House Performance
16. Adjusted Total Cost of Contract or ISSA Performance
17. Decision-Line 16 minus Line 15
18. Cost Comparison Decision: Accomplish Work
In-House (+)
Contract or ISSA (-)
Figure 2.1. The Generic A-76 Cost Comparison Form (GCCF)
The Generic A-76 Cost Comparison Form (GCCF)
In-House vs. Contract or ISSA Performance
19. In-House MEO Certified By: Date:
Office and Title
"I certify that, to the best ofmy knowledge and belief, the in-house organization reflected in this cost
comparison s the most efficient and cost effective organization that is fully capable of performing the scope
of work and tasks required by the Performance Work Statement. I further certify that I have obtained from
the appropriate authority concurrence that the organizational structure, as proposed, can and will be fully
implemented — subject to this cost comparison, in accordance with all applicable Federal regulations".
20. In-House Cost Estimate Prepared By: Date:
21. Independent: Date:
Office and Title
"I certify that I have reviewed the Performance Work Statement Management Plan, In-house cost estimate and
supporting documentation available prior to bid opening and, to the best ofmy knowledge and ability, have
determined that: (1) the ability of the in-house MEO to perform the work contained in the Performance Work
Statement at the estimated costs included in this cost comparison is reasonably established, (2) that all costs
entered on the cost comparison have been prepared in accordance with the requirements of Circular A-76 and
its Supplement."
22. Cost Comparison Completed By: Date:_
23. Contracting Officer: Date:
24. Tentative Cost Comparison
Decision Announced Bv: Date:
25. Appeal authority (if applicable) Date:
Figure 2.1. The Generic A-76 Cost Comparison Form (GCCF) Continued
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The Streamlined A-76 Cost Comparison Form (SCCF)
(Limited to 65 FTE or Less)
In-House vs. Contract or ISSA Performance
Performance Period









CONTRACT OR ISSA PERFORMANCE
6. Contract and ISSA Price Range
7. Contract Administration
8. Federal Taxes (-)
9. Total Contract and ISSA
Price Range
DECISION
10. Minimum Conversion Differential
1 1
.
Adjusted Total Cost of In-House Performance
12. Adjusted Total Cost of Contract or ISSA Performance
13. Decision-Line 12 minus Line 1
1
14. Cost Comparison Decision: Accomplish Work
Perform In-House (+)
Convert to Contract or ISSA (-)
Figure 2.2. The Streamlined A-76 Cost Comparison Form (SCCF)
(Limited to 65 FTE or Less)
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The Streamlined A-76 Cost Comparison Form (SCCF)
(Limited to 65 FTE or Less)
In-House vs. Contract or ISSA Performance
15. In-House Cost Estimate Prepared By: Date:
16. Independent Reviewer: Date:
Office and Title
"I certify that I have reviewed the proposed contract, in-house and ISSA cost estimates and contract prices and
find them to be reasonable and calculated in accordance with the principles and procedures of Circular A-76
and its supplement."
17. Cost Comparison Completed By: Date.
18. Contracting Officer: Date:
19. Tentative Cost Comparison
Decision Annouced By: Date:
20. Appeal Authority (if applicable) Date:
Figure 2.2. The Streamlined A-76 Cost Comparison Form (SCCF)
(Limited to 65 FTE or Less) Continued
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These two page forms appear relatively simple and straight forwarded. However, the
revised edition of Circular A-76 (transmittal memorandum number fifteen) dated
March 27, 1996, contains seventy-eight pages of requirements and instructions for
completing these two page forms. Within the seventy-eight pages are requirements
that create additional work load for the in-house staff. This additional workload
results from the circular's requirement that agencies compile data to complete the
Performance Work Statement (PWS) and the Most Efficient Organization (MEO).
The cost study process can take years to complete and can reduce the morale and
productivity of the federal employees whose jobs are at stake.
The reduction in morale and productivity has a ripple effect throughout the
activity being studied. This ripple effect is caused by the seniority structure within
the civil service system. Current regulations stipulate that an employee who is a
candidate for reduction-in-force(RIF) is eligible to take the position of a more junior
employee with similar skills. Theoretically, a plumber who has, in the past, filled a
secretarial/clerical government position, can take the position of a secretary with
fewer years of civil service. This process is commonly referred to as "bumping and
retreating within the command." This bumping and retreating results in periods of
dynamic change within the command as people relinquish old positions and assume
new ones. Depending on the timing and degree of downsizing, this can occur two to
three times per year. The new make-up often leaves managers with personnel who
have antiquated skills as well as a significant learning curve adjustment as these skills
are updated. This can affect the number of personnel required in the MEO.
The cost study process also impacts the morale ofthe activity managers. DOD
managers have testified to the GAO that they feel Circular A-76 micro manages their
operations and is exceedingly disruptive to the labor force. In an interview for this
thesis, a local area manager conveyed his experience with employees who are
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candidates for a RIF. In his November meetings with these employees, he fielded
questions like, "Should I buy Christmas presents?, Should I start braces for my
children?" Stress is created at all levels of the military and civilian organizations.
However, most managers agree that significant cost savings can be achieved through
outsourcing.
D. COSTING COMPARISON
This cost comparison is unfairly tilted against private contractors. Some ofthe
handicaps imposed include the following: [Ref. l:pp. 65-66]
A large penalty is imposed by the requirement that the private
contractor's bid beat the in-house cost estimate by at least ten percent
of personnel costs or $10 million over the performance period.
Previous requirements were based on the transition cost vice personnel
cost. Transition cost can be lower than personnel cost. Therefore, the
contractor must now beat the in-house estimate by a larger amount.
This shift has made contracting out more difficult rather than easier.
With a decreasing budget, this may be a move in the wrong direction.
Maybe, the requirements should even be reversed: the federal agency
should be required to beat the private contractor by greater the 10
percent of personnel cost.
The private bidder must submit a firm contract proposal with a fixed
price, whereas the agency is only required to submit a cost estimate.
This places the private bidder at a significant disadvantage; if the
private bidder's actual costs exceed its expected costs, it will not
receive additional Federal funds and may take a loss on the contract.
By contrast, the agency is not penalized for submitting low-cost
estimates. It can simply request supplemental agency funds midway
through the project. Even in the current era of tight budgets, agencies
can request and often receive supplemental funding.
The commercial firm's bid must include indirect costs, while the
agency's estimate does not. The U.S. Chamber ofCommerce estimated




• In negotiated procurement, very low bids may be rejected as being
"outside the competitive range." This rejection of lower bids allows
more commercial activities to stay in-house.
COST ESTIMATE TIME FRAMES
On average, cost studies have taken DOD agencies about two years to
complete, and 40 percent have taken more than two years. Figure 2.3 shows the time
taken to complete cost studies.





More than 4 years
Figure 2.3. Time Taken to Complete DOD A-76 Cost Studies [Ref. 6:p. 17]
The cost study completion times shown are critical to meeting the CNO's
stated purpose of saving $3 billion in fiscal year1998 through outsourcing. Many
studies have been ongoing and may be completed in time for the 1998 budget, but
many of the functions on the list have not initiated their cost studies. Only one
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of the four NPS activities identified as candidates for outsourcing had a cost study in
progress when the CNO's message was received. The Navy's Outsourcing Support
Office (OSO) has developed a methodology that could reduce completion times for
outsourcing competitions to less than a year. However, it has not been field-tested or
refined.
Problems associated with completing the cost estimates were identified by the
GAO in 1988. For example, the PWS and MEO are completed by managers and
employees whose jobs are at risk. Federal workers should not be required to study
themselves out of a job. In addition, these same employees are not properly trained
to complete the PWS used to develop the MEO. In-house staff have difficulty
precisely defining just what they do, and the standards of performance and quantity
of workload that the government is providing and expects to provide in the future.
Contract errors result from a poorly written PWS creating additional cost.
In addition to the difficulties associated with preparing the PWS and MEO, the
Army Inspector General identified several other problems in PWS preparation,
including: [Ref. 6:p. 19]
• Difficulties with guidance in OMB supplements to the circular,
• The lack of a lessons learned feedback to users,
• Inability of commercial activities to fully describe their activities,
• The absence of management information systems to collect accurate
work load data.
OSO's training and new streamlined approach may address these issues but the




In addition to giving an unfair advantage to retaining work in-house and the
strenuous requirements ofcompletingthe circular requirements, outsourcing has been
further encumbered by additional Congressional legislation. The National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 included the Nichols Amendment.
The amendment decentralizedA-76 authority in the military services. The provision
gave individual military installation commanders the authority and responsibility to
determine, without approval from A-76 officials at the services' headquarters, which
commercial activities at their facilities would be studied. Though decentralizing
authority and placing the decision making at the local level can be more efficient, the
provision did not give base commanders the proper incentives. In an interview for
this thesis, a local base commander lamented that contracting out more commercial
activities will cut his already severely reduced budget. Incentives as small as five to
ten percent ofoutsourcing savings would encourage base commanders to contract out.
These incentives could be used to apply additional resources to needed areas
throughout the organization.
The following is a list of Congressional restrictions which reduce the number
ofDOD commercial activities eligible for outsourcing:
Army depots are required to maintain civilian personnel levels for
communications-electronic depot maintenance at a number above the
levels on September 30, 1985.
Contracting out is forbidden for functions not already performed under
contract at the Crane Army Ammunition Activity, or the McAlester
Army Ammunition Activity.
The Corps of Engineers is prohibited from doing A-76 studies at any
reservoirs in Mississippi.
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DOD is prohibited from contracting more than 40 percent of depot
maintenance functions. 1
DOD is prohibited from contracting out core logistics functions. OMB
reports this restriction affects 75,000 positions and potential savings
estimated at $1.5 billion annually.
DOD is prohibited from contracting out fire and security activities.2
DOD is not alone in being restricted by Congressional legislation. Ten other
Executive agencies must deal with legislation that limits their contracting out
initiatives.
G. DECLINING NUMBER OF STUDIES
The cumbersome costing process, insufficient training for in-house staff, and
interference from Congress, have all contributed to a decline in the number of cost
studies undertaken by DOD. Figure 2.4 shows the decline in studies from 1987 to
1991. The Nichols amendment, which took effect in 1988, had a dramatic effect on
the number of studies in process. Services canceled 394 studies by May 5, 1991.
These cancellations occurred because Base Commanders did not expect the studies
to be completed in the mandated 2-year or 4-year completion time frames. A GAO
1 99 1 report stated Base Commanders, "chose not to start new studies when they were
not convinced of the A-76 program's benefits."
'In FY 1996 & 1997, DOD has requested a move to 50 percent in-house and
50 percent contracting. This request has been blocked by members of the Depot
Operations Subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed committees and House
and Senate Appropriations committees.
2In the 1997 Defense Appropriations Act, Congressman Sam Fair included
a special provision allowing Monterey Peninsula Area DOD activities to contract
out fire and security services.
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One possible explanation for the decline in cost studies, which will be
analyzed in this thesis, hypothesizes that these Base Commanders are faced with the
short term cost associated with the reductions-in-force required by the contracting out
process. These short term costs combined with the length of required time to
complete the studies and recapture the transition cost, give Base Commanders little
incentive to pursue outsourcing. With the CNO's emphasis on outsourcing
commercial activities, the number of studies will significantly increase in 1997. The
Department of the Navy's Biennial Budget for FY 1998/1999 expects outsourcing











Figure 2.4. Service's Ongoing A-76 Cost Studies [Ref. 5:p.6]
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III. OUTSOURCING'S SHORT TERM COST
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
Base Commanders considering outsourcing alternatives must adequately plan
for the short term costs. These short term costs are associated with buy outs and
relocating departing civilian personnel. Additional costs are generated when
employees depart before outsourcing contracts take affect. Base Commanders must
work closely with their Major Claimants to prevent end of year budget shortages.
Employees caught in base closures or contracting out activities have numerous
options for leaving the position being eliminated. Many of these options generate
short term costs in the losing activity. The following eight departure options were
compiled from data provided by NAS Alameda and FISC Oakland:
1
.
Personnel Priority Placement Program (PPP)/Stopper Match.
2. Variable Separation Incentive Pay (VSIP) upon resignation or separ-
ation.
3 Regular retirement/Retirement with VSIP.
4. VSIP with optional Variable Early Retirement Annuity (VERA).
5. Reduction in Force (RIF).




This chapter will briefly discuss each separationpr am and provide formulas
to estimate their short term cost. This chapter drew .ensively from copies of
OPM 's Employee's Buyout Guide and in-house documents provided by NPS's
Human Resources Office.
B. PERSONNEL PRIORITY PLACEMENT PROGRAM/STOPPER
MATCH
The Personnel Priority Placement Program (PPP) was developed in 1965 by
the Secretary of Defense. It provides involuntarily displaced employees an
opportunity to fill a vacant position at another activity. Today, the PPP is a unified
Defense-wide effort to assist:
• Displaced federal employees.
• Non-displaced overseas returnees and family members.
• Military spouses.
The releasing activity can expect to pay travel expenses, moving expenses, and
pre-employment physical expenses ofRIFed employees. Moving expenses can cost
tens of thousands of dollars for a single employee, depending on the circumstances
of the hiring and the employee's grade. Moving costs include real estate expenses,
transportation for the employee and dependents, temporary quarters allowance,
moving household goods, and non-temporary storage of household goods. NAS
Alameda obligates approximately $38,500 per PPP employee.
The receiving activity can expect additional expenses for grade and pay
retention Grade retention allows a RIFed employee taking a lower graded position
at another activity to retain grade for two years. Pay retention is granted to an
employee whose rate of basic pay would otherwise be reduced as a result of:
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• Expiration oftwo year period of grade retention.
• A reduction or elimination of special rates.
• Placement from a special rate position to a non-essential rate position.
• Placement in a different pay schedule.
The following example illustrates the interaction of grade and pay retention
that results in increased cost to the receiving activity. A transferred individual's
retained pay is GS-1 1, Step 10 ($47,353) and he/she is placed through the PPP into
a GS-7, Step 10 position ($31,995). Since the pay rate at the GS-7 Step 10 level is
lower than the GS-1 1 Step 10, the individual would be placed at GS-7 Step 00 and
retain his/her salary at the GS- 1 1 Step 1 level. They remain in this status until given
a salary that is higher than their retained pay.
The Defense Data Support Center (DDSC) in Dayton, Ohio acts as a
clearinghouse ofresumes. They list an overview ofthe registrants' employment data,
to ensure displaced federal employees receive priority consideration on positions at
other activities. This data base is often called the stopper match list. Activities
seeking to fill a vacancy must clear prospective employee's resumes based on the
following priorities:
Priority 1 : 1. A person being RIFed with no offer of continuing
employment.
2. A person being furloughed for six or more months.
Priority 2 : 1 . A person who has received a RIF notice for separation
and is offered a change to a grade two or more grades
lower than their current position.
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2. A person who declines a functional transfer.
3
.
A person who receives a RIF notice and declines an offer
of reassignment outside the commuting area.
4. A person who has received an involuntary change to a
lower grade oftwo or more grades due to a reclassifica-
tion.
Priority 3 : 1 . A person who receives a RIF notice for separation but is
offered a change to a lower grade by one grade.
2. A person receiving an involuntary change to a lower
grade by one grade due to a reclassification.
The above list ofpriorities only includes situations involving a RIF. Other PPP
priorities result from overseas returnees, military spouses, etc.... OMB instructions
include an additional twenty-one exceptions to this abbreviated priority list.
C. VARIABLE SEPARATION INCENTIVE PAY (VSIP)
The purpose ofa VSIP is to minimize or avoid involuntary separations through
costly and disruptive RIFs. The cost of separating an employee by RIF is far greater
than paying employees to depart voluntarily. VSIPs are awarded to employees
departing via resignation, early retirement, or regular retirement. The most current
features of the VSIP, sometimes referred to as buyouts, were included in the Fiscal
Year 1997 Omnibus SpendingLaw, Public Law 104-208, dated September 30, 1996.
Under this law, the amount of the buyout is equal to the lesser of:
1 . The severance pay calculation;
2 $25,000; or
3. An amount determined by the agency head.
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An employee is eligible to receive a buyout if the employee:
1
.
Receives a buyout offer on or after October 1 , 1 996 and before
December 31, 1997;
2. Accepts the buyout offer;
3. Voluntary retires, retires under early retirement, or voluntarily resigns
during the approved buyout window; or
4. Is not subject to any of the exclusions below.
An employee is not eligible to receive a buyout if the employee:
1
.
Is a re-employed annuitant;
2. Has a disability on the basis of which the employee is or would be
eligible for a disability retirement;
3. Is serving under an appointment with a time limitation;




Has received a specific notice of involuntary separation for misconduct
or unacceptable performance;
6. Is completing service in order to receive an approved "delayed buyouf
'
under the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994;
7. Has received a buyout before but had not repaid it;
8. Is covered by statutory re-employment rights from another organiza-
tion;
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9. Has received a recruitment or relocation bonus within 24 months of
separating to receive a buyout;
10. Has received a retention bonus within 12 months of separating to
receive a buyout.
A buyout taker must repay the entire amount of the incentive to the agency
which paid the buyout ifthe employee accepts employment with the Government of
the United States or under a personal services contract within five years of separating
with the incentive.
Severance Pay Calculations
The amount of severance pay would be one week's basic pay for each of the
first ten years of civilian service, plus two weeks' basic pay for each year over ten
years. An age adjustment allowance often percent is added for each year over forty.
No credit is given for military service unless the service interrupted otherwise
creditable civilian service and the employee returned to civilian service by exercising
a legal restoration right. Total severance pay may not exceed one year's pay at the
employee's pay rate immediately before separation. Appendix A contains a sample
buy out worksheet and a required age adjustment table.
D. REGULAR RETIREMENT/REGULAR RETIREMENT WITH VSIP
Federal employees can choose regular retirement when their position is
contracted out. The employees can be under one oftwo plans:
1
.
Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS).
2. Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS).
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The CSRS covers all eligible civil service employees who were hired prior to
1984. It provides benefits based on grade and years of service. Many CSRS
employees are eligible for retirement at age fifty-five with thirty years of service or
age sixty with twenty years of service. FERS took affect on January 1, 1987.
Generally, it included those employees hired after December 3 1 , 1 983, and any CSRS
employees who chose to convert to FERS. The FERS provides federal employees a
savings and retirement system with tax benefits similar to the private sectors 40 IK
plans. Regular retirement of employees results in additional cost for unpaid leave.
Retiring employee's VSIPs are calculated the same as separating employees.
E. VSIP WITH OPTIONAL VOLUNTARY EARLY RETIREMENT
ANNUITY
The Office ofPersonnel Management (OMB) can authorize an agency to offer
early retirementto eligible employees in certain jobs that are critical to the agency's
operation. The agency may change this list before the early retirement window
closes. A retirement window is a period oftime during which eligible employees can
take early retirement. Normally this coincides with the window during which buy
outs are offered. An agency may set limits on the number of early retirements.
Members are eligible for retirement as follows:
1
.
If under the CSRS, they must have served in a position covered by the
CSRS for at least one year out of the two years immediately before
retirement. This rule does not apply for employees under the FERS.
2. Candidates must be at least fifty years of age with twenty years of
service or have twenty-five years of service at any age. At least five
years must be civilian service, whether under CSRS or FERS.
3 Candidates must be serving under other than a temporary appointment.
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4. Candidates must have been on an agency's rolls at least thirty days
before the agency requested authority from OPM and served contin-
uously since that date without a break in service.
Early Retirement Calculations
CSRS employees accepting early retirement under the voluntary early
retirement authority will have a reduction in their annuity oftwo percent per year for
each year they are under age fifty-five. This is a permanent reduction in the annuity.
FERS employees will not have their annuities reduced under voluntary early
retirement. Employees with both CSRS and FERS will only have a reduction for the
CSRS portion of their service under age fifty-five. CSRS employees will receive
service credit for any unused sick leave in determining their annuity. FERS
employees do not receive sick leave credits. VERA employees are eligible for VSIP
incentives.
F. REDUCTION IN FORCE (RIF)
The RIF is the least desirable and most expensive separation alternative. A
RIF is regulated under Section Five of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The
CFR defines a RIF as, "those situations in which an agency releases a competing
employee from his or her competitive level by furlough for more than thirty days,
separation, demotion or reassignment requiring displacement when the release is
required because of lack of work; shortage of funds; insufficient personnel ceiling;
reorganization; the exercise of re-employment rights or restoration rights, or
reclassification of an employee's position due to an erosion of duties when such
action will take effect after an agency has formally announced a reduction-in-force




In Senior Executive Service (SES),
2. Whose appointment is required by Congress,
3. Terminated from a temporary or term promotion or returning to the
position held before the temporary or term promotion or to one of
equivalent grade and pay.
4. Changed to a lower grade after reclassifying an employee's position.
5. Changed to a lower grade after reclassifying an employee's position
due to an erosion of duty.
All RIF's must be approved by OMB and can substantially increase short term
costs. These costs include severance pay, lump-sum leave payments (up to thirty
days), moving cost, and indirect/non budgetary costs associated with staff time in
processing and administering a RIF (a placement program, and the handling of
appeals and grievances). Later sections will discuss placement programs and labor-
management implications of a RIF.
G. TRANSFER TO ANOTHER FEDERAL ACTIVITY
There are no short term costs associated with employees transferring to federal
activities within commute distances. However, losing activities pay the moving
expenses of employees transferring outside commuting distances. Activities can
expect moving expenses similar to those described under PPP.
H. TERMINATION
It is inevitable that some employees will leave as a result of termination due
to poor performance, unacceptable conduct, or for medical reasons. Terminations due
to poor performance or unacceptable conduct will occur whether or not an activity is
being outsourced or closed. Therefore, costs associated with these separations will
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not be considered in this study. However, costs due to medical separation can
increase for activities being closed or outsourced. In an interview for this thesis, the
Director of the Human Resources Office at NPS stated that medical termination and
disability claims will increase as outsourcing or closing becomes imminent.
Commands will not only be faced with the short term costs of lump sum leave
payments but will have indefinite disability payments.
I. VOLUNTARY RESIGNATION/SEPARATION
Voluntary separations or resignations are normally associated with junior or
newly hired personnel. There are no costs associated with these two departure
alternatives.
J. EARLY DEPARTURES
Short term costs for employees departing before their positions are terminated
can be significant. The GAO studied a maintenance installationwhere an outsourcing
cost study had been announced. GAO reported that affected employees began leaving
for other jobs at the outset of the cost study. The permanent work force declined
throughout the study process. The backlog of maintenance work increased. The
government had to supplement the in-house work-force by hiring the contractor, on
an interim basis, before the contract start date. The government had to pay an
additional $550,000 on a $1 million contract to cover the maintenance backlog.
K. MISCELLANEOUS COST
Miscellaneous additional costs are associated with closing and outsourcing
activities. When a significant number of positions are outsourced, activities usually
set up career transition assistance teams. Many times, these teams involve new hires,
which creates additional short term costs. Many non-quantifiable costs must be
budgeted, including workman's compensation and environmental clean-up. Out-
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sourcing activities experiencing bumping and retreating, as described in Chapter II
will face additional costs for grade retention and pay retention. These costs can
extend for over two years.
This chapter has illustrated the many costs base commanders must address
when closing or outsourcing an activity. The cost per employee can vary from a few
days ofunpaid leave, to $40,000 to relocate transferring personnel. Costs can exceed
$40,000 for workman's compensation payments and a RIF. The cost savings from
closing an outsourcing activity are long term - normally well beyond the tenure of
frequently rotating base commanders. Support from the Major Claimant level and





Data pertaining to separation alternatives was gathered from the Naval Supply
Center Oakland and NAS Alameda. Initially, it seemed data from two closing bases
located in the same region would not represent the general circumstances faced by
outsourcing activities. All bases in this local area are being closed. Therefore,
outsourced employees don't have the opportunity to transfer to other local federal
activities. However, considering the general downsizingwithin DOD, it is reasonable
to assume that outsourced employees in most activities will not have the opportunity
to transfer to another local federal agency. This chapter will give a brief history of
NAS Alameda and the Naval Supply Center at Oakland (provided by the respective
HROs), present the data gathered, and qualitatively discuss BRAC and outsourcing
issues.
B. HISTORY OF NAVAL AIR STATION ALAMEDA
The keel for NAS Alameda was laid in December 1917, when Congressman
John J. Mulvany decided the island would make an ideal naval base. The idea of a
naval base was essentially unrealized until the late 1930's, at which time only a few
buildings were in place. The base steadily grew until NAS Alameda was
commissioned on November 1, 1940. The initial staff included 200 civilians and a
small complement of active duty naval personnel.
The new naval air station grew rapidly during World War II and became
known as, "The Aviation Gateway to the Pacific." After World War II, thousands left
the station's payroll and returned to their former occupations. Under the "Program for
Peace," NAS Alameda placed equal emphasis on all phases of its primary mission:
providing facilities and support for fleet aviation activities. This included overhauling
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and repairing fleet aircraft, supplying many types of aircraft and equipment, berthing
and fueling the largest aircraft carriers, and providing military personnel training
facilities. The station's total area covers 2,842 acres with runways designed to
accommodate the largest aircraft. The 1992 BRAC selected NAS Alameda for
closure. The final closure is scheduled for April 25, 1997.
Separation Method FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997
YTD 2/97
Total
Regular Retirement 4 1 1 6
PPP 8 33 12 53
Voluntary Resignation 12 11 2 29
VSIP w/Regular
Retirement
7 13 1 21
VSIP with VERA 18 4 22
VSIP upon Resignation 3 1 4
RIF with Separation 7 14 4 25
Transfer to other Activity 8 7 15
Termination 1 1
Stopper Match 3 3
Medical Termination 2 2
Total Separations 54 102 25 181










Figure 4.1. NAS Alameda FY 1995, 1996, YTD 1997 (2/3/97)
C. HISTORY OF THE NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER OAKLAND
As early as 1910, the Navy Department recognized the need for an adequate
Naval base on San Francisco Bay. However, the idea for a Naval base on San
Francisco Bay was dormant until 1936 when the Commandant of the 12 th Naval
District recommended the Oakland Middle Harbor site in West Oakland. In 1939,
Congress authorized purchasing five hundred acres from the city ofOakland; the rest
of the site was purchased from two railroad companies.
Like NAS Alameda, the Oakland base was a fledgling activity until the
beginning of World War II. On December 15, 1941, the Navy Supply Depot was
formally activated. During the next five years, the Supply Depot grew to an
enormous supply machine for the Pacific theater. In the late 1940's, the depot made
the transition to a Naval Supply Center and began to manage satellite sites and tenant
activities.
Throughout the next fifty years, the Supply Center assumed numerous
functions. In the mid-1950's, the center assumed financial functions for local area
Naval activities and assumed a regional procurement and contracting role for local
and overseas activities. In the late 1950's, Oakland became the first Supply Center
to generate electronic data. The center began to prepare Supply Operations assistance
programs for the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. In the mid- 1 970's, Oakland assumed the
civilian personnel functions for the San Francisco Bay Public Works Center, and the
California and Nevada Commissary Store Region.
The Oakland Supply Center grew to become a worldwide aviation supply
support facility, providing state-of-the-art Navy warehousing. The center continued
to expand its capabilities after the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1992, the BRAC












Regular Retirement 3 3
PPP 11 28 4 43
Voluntary Resignation 11 13 2 1 27
VSIP w/Reg.
Retirement
VSIP w/VERA 12 13 25
VSIP upon Resignation 40 19 34 15 108
RIF w/Separation 28 42 5 75
Transfer to other
Activity
5 26 19 2 52
Termination 2 1 3
Stopper Match
Medical Termination 1 1 2
Functional Transfer 71 3 74
Deaths 3 3
Total 139 119 126 31 415
Table 4.2. Naval Supply Center Oakland FY 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997
YTD (2/3/97)
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NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER OAKLAND
Regular Retirement 0.8%
PPP 12.6 %




n Termination 1 .3%
Death 0.8%
Figure 4.2. Naval Supply Center Oakland FY 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 (2/3/97)
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D. ANALYSIS
From a budgeting perspective, the primary objective in closing or outsourcing
an activity is to complete the change at the lowest possible cost. Therefore, it is
essential for activities to fund programs that give employees an incentive to
voluntarily leave. Minimizing PPP, transfers, and the more expensive RIFs is critical.
Oakland's functional transfers in 1994 and 1995 were not included in the separation
percentage calculation. These functional transfers resulted in the bumping and
retreating described in the previous chapter. The transfers were temporary and the
employees eventually left under another alternative.
Alameda and Oakland kept their RIFs at approximately 14% and 22%
respectively. However, the combination ofRIFs, PPP and transfers to other activities
totaled 53% and 49% for each activity. These numbers indicate an outsourcing
activity could pay $ 38,000 or more for approximately 50% of its outsourced
employees. Cost estimates of $ 38,000 or more is based on the studied activities
committing $ 38,000 for each PPP or transfer and potential RIFs costs exceeding $
38,000.
With DOD's declining budget, these short term costs can be prohibitive,
preventing activities from realizing outsourcing's long term cost savings. For
example, an activity hoping to outsource one hundredjobs can expect potential short
term costs up to $ 1,900,000 or more. It is imperative that outsourcing activities get
out in front ofthese cost by encouraging other alternatives. More important, further
cost reduction can be achieved through voluntary departures.
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E. DISCUSSION 3
For BRAC'ed activities like Alameda and Oakland, the issue of separating
employees is driven by the way the mission changes as the activity draws down. The
comptroller must forecast through time the activity's mission and performance level.
Activities have to manage the separation of employees while retaining those required
to meet the mission. For example, a supply department can face an immediate
decrease in mission requirements and personnel. At the same time, the personal
property departmentmay grow requiring additional personnel . In addition to meeting
the changing mission, activities must deal with employees departing before their
position becomes excess.
If an activity's mission does not change due to outsourcing, it will still have
to control the flow ofpeople. Some employees will depart as soon as they hear their
function faces outsourcing. Others will remain to the end, at times scrambling to take
an open position or engage in bumping and retreating. The activity must develop a
system of incentives that will encourage employees to leave when the activity needs
them to leave.
It is obviously desirable to avoid the costs associated with RIFs and other high
cost separation alternatives. The example citing potential short term costs over
$1,900,000 for every one-hundred jobs outsourced was given to shock activities in
to getting out in front of these costs.
F. COST REDUCING ALTERNATIVES
The first alternative is for the command to conduct a job fair. Job fairs
establish the mind set of voluntary separations. Job fair costs were estimated to be
3This discussion and subsequent sections in this chapter are based on
interviews with the Comptroller ofNAS Alameda, and the current and former
Comptrollers of the Naval Supply Center at Oakland.
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between $ 25,000 and $50,000. Job fairs will create a lot of excitement and
awareness of the coming BRAC, but will not result in many employees receiving a
firm offer. Oakland estimated that three to five employees were placed per job fair.
Although not many employees were placed, the $5,000 to $10,000 cost per placed
employee was significantly lower than a potential of $38,000 or more.
Another effective but more difficult alternative is for activities to contract with
job placement agencies. Activities will pay a commission for each employee placed
in a non government job. The contracting process is more difficult. Contracting
offices have little experience with this contract type. The lack of experience can
make the Command and its legal office nervous about the legal implications ofpaying
a bounty to placement agencies. However, the activities get a guaranteed bang for the
buck. For every XX dollars, an employee leaves the activity. Once commands are
comfortable with the legal aspects of these contracts, they must determine what their
comfort level is for each employee placed. Will it be $5,000 or $15,000? At either
cost, the activity is reducing its short term cost below the VSIP maximum of $25,000.
Activities should consider funding continuingeducation programs. The BRAC
and outsourcing process can take from one to five years to complete. This allows
outsourced employees time to attend day and/or night classes to complete retraining.
Employees who accept continuing education grants would voluntarily separate
without the payment ofVSIPs or other benefits. The success of continuing education
programs depends on the region of the outsourcing activities. Areas like the San
Francisco Bay Area and the Silicon Valley seem ideal for a continuing education
program and that would lend to placement of a retrained employee in a private sector
job.
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G. HUMAN RESOURCES RESPONSIBILITIES
Besides developing a system of incentives that encourage outsourced
employees to leave when the activity needs them to leave, the activity must convince
the employees that their job is going away. People can be their own best friend or
worse enemy. They can help or hurt themselves if they delay necessary decisions.
Commands have a responsibility to get people to confront the issue as soon as
possible. It can be compared to people facing the death of a loved one. The person
will go through various emotional stages from griefto anger to denial. At some point,
they realize that they have to do something. This is when the command can help
them. Commands need to have knowledgeable people available to help outsourced
employees. Major claimants must be prepared to fund Career Transition Assistance
programs.
The data presented in this chapter shows that employees will leave via several
different alternatives. However, many will stay right down to the last day. Some
people think that the good competitive people will be aggressive and leave on their
own. The comptroller interviewed for this discussion found that a lot of the very
good, very competitive people believe that because they are so good they will be the
last to go. While some of the best people are the best at their job, many are not able
to emotionally deal with losing theirjob. This cuts across many skill levels, intellects,
and seniority levels.
One comptroller found that senior level, GS-12 and GS-13, personnel
presented interesting situations that are likely to occur at outsourcing activities. He
found that many of the GS-12's and GS-13's who were not waiting to retire held on
to the bitter end. They would begin to look around the command for other jobs.
Activities must remember that these people are in a position to protect their jobs by
making deals. He did not imply that there was "An overt thing to get everybody else
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so I can hang on to a job." However, they do attend the big meetings and have the
visibility that allows them to look around the command. His point was that activities
need to carefully consider the "position" to be RIFed and not the "person."
Favoritism can be detrimental to an already low morale.
This chapter has presented the data gathered from two activities selected by the
BRAC commission, discussed the tangible short term cost associated with closure,
proposed alternatives to reduce short term cost, and presented potential human
resources issues. In addition to these issues, outsourcing activities will face many
legal issues. The next chapter will address these legal issues.
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V. REDUCTION IN FORCE AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
In addition to dealing with short term costs and human resources issues,
activities facing a reduction in force must comply with relevant case law and the
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). This chapter will review the relevant
case law and the FLRA, and the impact ofa RIF on Equal Employment Opportunities
(EEO).
B. EMPLOYEES AND THE UNION
Since RIFs are usually driven by forces external to the control of manage-
ment, the union and employees should be involved in all aspects of a RIF. The
comptrollers interviewed for this thesis found that it is advantageous to inform
employees ofa RIF as soon as possible. This notification should include the positions
affected, issues to be addressed, and should be updated frequently. This is similar to
the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) findings that, "the negotiability of a
particular matter should not be an issue unless the parties are unable to reach
consensus through partnership." This "partnership" is what the interviewed
comptrollers found to be essential to implementing a RIF while limiting additional
damage to morale.
Management/Laborpartnerships are required by Executive Order 12871. This
order states that each agency will "create labor-managementpartnershipsby forming
labor-management committees or councils at appropriate levels, or adapting existing
councils or committees if such groups exist to help reform Government." Not all
stakeholders can agree on all aspects of a RIF. Collective bargaining may be required
to resolve these differences. [Ref. 8:p. 1] The next section provides an abbreviated
review ofOPM's March 1996 bulletin. Again, it is an abbreviated review that neither
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includes all issues covered in case law nor does it give an exhaustive review of the
cases discussed Cases used to set the legal precedence will be included in brackets
after the applicable law is cited.
C. LAW AND REGULATION REVIEW
An agency has the right to conduct a RIF under Title 5 United States Code
(USC) Subsection 7106 (a)(2)(A) <USDA. Forest Service . 45 FLRA No. 21: Naval
Underwater Systems Center. 29 FLRA No. 47; Kansas Army National Guard . 21
FLRA No. 4>. When implementing a RIF, agencies must adhere to the requirements
of Chapter 35 of title 5, United States Code; OPM's Government-wide Regulations
Part 35 1 of title 5, Code ofFederal Regulations, and Chapter 71 of title 5. Agencies
must include the applicable language of any existing contract, and are obligated to
bargain over procedures and appropriate arrangements for employees affected by the
RIF. [Ref. 9] Some issues that may require negotiation are:
1. Notice to employees.
2. Notice to unions.
3. Competitive areas.
4. Competitive levels.
D. NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
OPM requires employees receive a written notice at least 60 days prior to the
effective date of a RIF. The number of days is negotiable. NAS Alameda's contract
negotiations require 60 days notice for less than 50 people and 120 days notice for
more than 50 people. The written notice must contain the following information:
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1.
The action to be taken.
2. The reasons for the action.
3. The effective date.
4. The employee's competitive area.
5. The competitive level.
6. Subgroup.
7. Service date.
8. Annual performance ratings of record received during the last four
years.
9. The place where the employee may inspect the regulations and record
pertinent to the case.




Information on reemployment rights.
12. The employee's right to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board
or to grieve under a negotiated grievance procedure. [Ref. 10]
Agencies may request approval from the Director ofOPM for a notice period
of shorter than 60 days (but no fewer than 30 days) if the RIF is caused by
circumstances not reasonably foreseeable. [Ref. 1 1 ] OPM found that agencies also
need to be aware that overly long notice periods may result in a greater number of
employees separating via a RIF.
Appendix B illustrates FISC Oakland's Certificate of Expected Separation.
This notification was issued early in the separation process. As indicated in the
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Commanding Officer's remarks, excess positions are identified by a mock RIF. In
the case of outsourcing, most positions will be determined during the outsourcing
process. Additional supervisory positions will have to be determined through a
process similar to a mock RIF. The letter authorizes early registration in the PPP, and
informs the recipient of assistance available through the Job Training Partnership Act
(JTPA) and the DOD Reemployment Priority List (RPL).
Appendix B also illustrates FISC Oakland's Notice of Separation by
Reduction-in-Force (RIF). This employee was given sixty-five days notice. Not
shown is the employee's signature verifying receipt of the notice.
E. NOTICE TO THE UNION
Unions have a statutory right under 5 USC subsection 3502 (d)(1)(A) to
written notification of a management decision to implement a RIF. Under the law,
the notice is the same as that provided to the employee, and notice must be given to
the union when it is given to the employee. This right is independent of any rights
under Chapter 71 of title 5 USC. This new requirement should not be viewed as
relieving agencies of any obligation under Chapter 7 1 or current contract language to
provide the union with sufficient notice and the opportunity to bargain over impact
and implementation of the decision to conduct a RIF. Agencies and unions should
review their current contracts to identify language concerning advance notice to the
union. If the language is inconsistent with 5 USC Subsection 3502(d)(1)(A), the
agency and the union should attempt to update the contract. The fact that the contract
may provide for a shorter notice period to the union does not automatically release the
agency from its obligation under subsection 3502 (d)(1)(A) -- especially if the




The way in which the competitive area is defined will have an impact on the
scope of the RIF. A competitive area may include all or part of an agency. The
minimum competitive area in the Department of the Navy is a bureau, major
command, directorate or other equivalent major subdivision of an agency within the
local commuting area. In thefield, the minimum competitive area is an activity under
separate administration within the local commuting area (italics added). A
competitive area must be defined solely in terms ofan agency's organizational unit(s)
and geographical location, and it must include all employees, both supervisory and
nonsupervisory within the defined competitive area. A broad competitive area will
likely increase an employee's opportunity to displace other employees, thus affecting
more employees. A more narrow competitive area will limit some employees'
opportunities in a major RIF, but will 'contain' the affects of the RIF. [Ref. 8:p. 5]
The issue of competitive areas has been addressed by the courts on numerous
occasions. The first case involved the Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point v. FLRA,
952 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The court addressed the issue of "vitally affects."
The court ruled on the issue ofnegotiations in one unit affecting employees in another
unit. The court found that "It has never been thought that the policies underlying the
'vitally affects' test are strong enough to overcome the far more fundamental principle
involvingthe sanctity ofcertification/recognitionand exclusive representation." [Ref.
8:p. 6] The court's decision limits the scope ofthe competitive areas an outsourcing
activity must include in negotiating with the local certified union.
The issue of including supervisory personnel in negotiations was reviewed by
the FLRA. In National Weather Service Employees Organization and Commerce. 44
FLRA No.3, the FLRA, "viewed OPM's regulation as forcing the union to include
supervisory personnel in the proposal rather than the union seeking on its own to
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include them." [Ref 8:p. 6] Therefore, supervisory personnel are included in
competitive area negotiations.
G. COMPETITIVE LEVELS
The code of federal regulations defines a competitive level for RIF purposes
as, "all positions in the competitive area which are in the same grade (or occupational
level) and classification series, and which are similar enough in duties, qualification
requirements, pay schedules, and working conditions so that the incumbent of one
position could successfully perform the critical elements of any other position upon
entry into it, without any loss of productivity beyond that normally expected in the
orientation of any new but fully qualified employee." [Ref. 12] In accordance with
the FLRA, the competitive level of an employee is nonnegotiable. The negotiation
of competitive levels would violate management's rights to assign employees to
positions under section 7106(a)(2)(A).
This issue was addressed in Charleston Naval Shipyard 44 FLRA No.55. This
ruling addressed a proposal requiring the agency keep certain groups of employees
in the same competitive level. The FLRA found that the proposal, "directly and
excessively interferes with the Agency's rights to assign and select employees." [Ref.
8:p. 9]
All comptrollers interviewed for this thesis were aware of this right but
believed that competitive levels are often negotiated. Negotiations were informal and
driven by union rules regarding employee skills and seniority. They found they were
often left with employees requiring significant additional training.
H. OTHER ISSUES
Other matters that unions may negotiate concerning the impact and implemen-
tation of a RIF might include: permitting employees paid release time to prepare
resumes/applications/ 1 7 l's for a new job; access to office computers or copiers to
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prepare documents used in job searches; paid release time for interviews; agency
sponsoredjob fairs; outplacement and counseling for affected employees; retraining
employees for different jobs, etc. [Ref. 8:p. 12]
I. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IMPLICATIONS
In February 1994, the GAO reported on the EEO implications of a RIF. The
following is an excerpt from the Summary Statement of Nancy R. Kingsbury,
Director Federal Human Resource Management Issues:
GAO recently completed a review of the impact of reduction-in-force
(RIFs) at three Department ofDefense installations on groups covered
by EEO laws.... GAO found that the RIFs resulted in separations of
minorities in numbers disproportionateto the numbers in the workforce
at the three locations reviewed. Women were separated in dispropor-
tionate numbers at two of the locations. In some cases, dispropor-
tionate numbers of separations occurred largely because members of
these groups did not have the tenure, veteran's preference, or
performance-adjusted seniority of non minorities or men. In other
cases, the disproportionate separations occurred because minorities
occupied a large proportion of the positions abolished and the
employees had no assignment rights to other positions.... GAO analysis
of the retention factors for civilian workers employed by the military
services at the end of fiscal year 1991 showed that minorities and
women ranked lower than their non minority and male counterparts in
all retention factors. Thus, they may continue to be vulnerable to
disproportionate separation rates in any future RIFs.... On the other
hand, downsizing alternatives which emphasize encouraging voluntary
retirements and resignations with separation incentives, may have the
effect of relatively larger numbers of white males leaving voluntarily,
and the overall diversity of the smaller workforce may improve.
Outsourcing activities have voluntary separation incentives available to
encourage the separation of non minorities. VERA's and voluntary separations not
only reduce short term costs but help maintain a diverse workplace. As stated by the
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Director Federal Human ResourceManagement issues, RIFs separate more minorities
than nonminorities. Maintaining a diverse workplace creates further incentives to
minimize the number of employees separated by a RIF.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
In response to the Navy's eye-glasses laboratory's announcement of a wider
selection of attractive frames, the CNO asked "Why are we still making our own
glasses?" The CNO's incredulous response reflects the growing sentiment in DOD
of the need to outsource more of its support activities. The agency's Defense Science
Board found that DOD could save $30 billion a year-more than the entire defense
budget of all but five foreign countries- by turning over many of its subsidiary
businesses to more-efficient commercial contractors. [Ref. 16:pp. 22-23] This thesis
found that DOD's outsourcing procedures and incentives must be fundamentally
changed to encourage outsourcing. These changes, combined with attention similar
to the CNO's, will increase outsourcing activity and allow DOD to meet critical
needs.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Because of declining defense budgets, short term costs can prevent activities
from realizing the outsourcing's long term savings. Activities should have the proper
combination of monetary incentives, job placement and retraining programs, staff
skills, and legislation to encourage outsourcing. This should be looked upon as the
necessary up front investment whenever substantial outsourcing initiatives are
planned. The following changes are recommended:
1
.
Activities should fund programs that encourage employees to separate
voluntarily. Activities must avoid the higher costs of PPP's, transfers,
and RIF's.
2. Federal workers facing outsourcing should not be required to complete
the PWS and MEO required to outsource their positions. An in-house
staff should be formed to complete these requirements. Each member
of the in-house staff should have an opportunity to complete the OSO's
course.
3. DOD should provide incentives for commands to begin and or
complete outsourcing studies. A proper incentive structure would
allow individual installations to keep a percentage of the outsourced
savings and encourage them to focus on the long term costs savings.
4. Major claimants should fund outsourcing's short term costs, which
include the cost of employee buy-outs, job fairs, job training programs,
job placement programs, and transition assistance programs.
5. An outsourcing activity's staff should include personnel with human
resources skills. These staffs should encourage outsourced employees
to take advantage ofjob placement and retraining programs that reduce
outsourcing's short term costs.
6. Outsourcing activities should use voluntary separation incentives to
encourage the separation of non minorities. Using VERA's will limit
the number of minority personnel lost and help maintain a diverse
workplace.
In their article "Strategic Outsourcing" James Brian Quinn and Frederick G.
Hilmer found that, "Two new strategic approaches, when properly combined, allow
managers to leverage their companies' skills and resources well beyond levels
available with other strategies. Those strategies are:
1
.
Concentrating the firm's own resources on a set 'of core competencies'
where it can achieve definable preeminence and provide unique value
for customers.
2. Strategically outsourcing other activities—including many traditionally
considered integral to any company—where the firm has neither a
critical strategic need nor special capabilities."
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The United States has already established itself as the world's preeminent
military force. Quinn and Hilmer's idea of leveraging of resources through
outsourcing will be critical for DOD to maintain its preeminence while recapitalizing
and modernizing its forces during a period of declining budgets.
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APPENDIX A. VSIP WORKSHEET
Example of VSIP Estimation Worksheet
line 1. Salary at time of separation (GS- 14/ 10) =$81,217
line 2. Weekly Rate (line 1 divided by 52) = $ 1,561.87
line 3. Years of Service (see A and B below) = 18
A. If your length of service is LESS THAN 10 years,
enter your length of service on line 3a.
B. If your length of service is MORE THAN 10 years:
1) enter your length of service: 18
2) subtract 10 from your length of service: - 10
3) multiply the result, in this case, 8, by 2: 16
4) add 10 to the amount listed in 3. + 10
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5) enter this total on line 3a. This is the factor for your
adjusted years of service and tells you APPROXI-
MATELY the number ofweeks of severance pay you
would be entitled to.
line 3 a. Adjusted Years of Service = 26
line 4. Basic Severance Pay (multiply amount on line 2
by number on line 3a —
Adjusted Years of Service) = $40,608.50
line 5. Age Adjustment Factor (if your age is above 40, look
your age up on the "AGE TABLE AND FACTOR"
chart attached. Enter the "factor" number shown).
line 6. Severance Pay Amount
^Multiply line 4 by line 5 factor
40608.50X2.20 = $89,338.70
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line 6a. If line 6 exceeds line 1, enter amount on line 1.
The amount of severance pay will be $81,217
Buyout Amount
If line 6a exceeds $25,000 (or a lower maximum amount set by the agency
head), but is more than line 1, enter amount on line 1.
OR
If line 6a does not exceed $25,000 (or a lower maximum amount),
but is more than line 1, enter amount on line 1.
YOUR BUYOUT AMOUNT: $25,000
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Buyout Estimation Worksheet
line 1. Salary at time of separation (GS- ) =
line 2. Weekly Rate (line 1 divided by 52) =
line 3. Years of Service (see A and B below)
A. If your length of service is LESS THAN 10
years, enter your length of service on line 3 a.
B. If your length of service is MORE THAN 10
years:
1) enter your length of service:
2) subtract 10 from your length of service: - 10
3) multiply the result by 2:
4) add 10 to the amount listed in 3) +10
5) enter this total on line 3a. This is the
factor for your adjusted years of service
and tells you APPROXIMATELY the
number of weeks of severance pay you
would be entitled to.
line 3a. Adjusted Years of Service
line 4. Basic Severance Pay (multiply amount on
line 2 by number on line 3a ~ Adjusted Years
of Service) =
line 5. Age Adjustment Factor (if your age is above 40,
look your age up on the "AGE TABLE AND
FACTORS" chart below. Enter the "factor"
number shown).
Age = years and months. Factor
line 6. Severance Pay Amount
Multiply line 4 by line 5 factor $
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line 6a. If line 6 exceeds line 1, enter amount
on line 1.
The amount of severance pay will be $
line Buyout Amount
If line 6a exceeds $25,000 (or a lower
maximum amount set by the agency head)
but is more than line 1, enter amount in line 1.
OR
If line 6a does not exceed $25,000 (or a
lower maximum amount), but is more than
line 1, enter amount on line 1.
YOUR BUYOUT AMOUNT: $
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40 3-5 1.025 48 4-8 1.850 56 9-11 2.675
40 6-8 1.050 48 9-11 1.875 57 0-2 2.700
40 9-11 1.075 49 0-2 1.900 57 3-5 2.725
41 0-2 1.100 49 3-5 1.925 57 6-8 2.750
41 3-5 1.125 49 6-8 1.950 57 9-11 2.775
41 6-8 1.150 49 9-11 1.975 58 0-2 2.800
41 9-11 1.175 50 0-2 2.000 58 3-5 2.825
42 0-2 1.200 50 3-5 2.025 58 6-8 2.850
42 3-5 1.225 50 6-8 2.050 58 9-11 2.875
42 6-8 1.250 50 9-11 2.075 59 0-2 2.900
42 9-11 1.275 51 0-2 2.100 59 3-5 2.925
43 0-2 1.300 51 3-5 2.125 59 6-8 2.950
43 3-5 1.325 51 6-8 2.150 59 9-11 2.975
43 6-8 1.350 51 9-11 2.175 60 0-2 3.000
43 9-11 1.375 52 0-2 2.200 60 3-5 3.025
44 0-2 1.400 52 3-5 2.225 60 6-8 3.050
44 3-5 1.425 52 6-8 2.250 60 9-11 3.075
44 6-8 1.450 52 9-11 2.275 61 0-2 3.100
44 9-11 1.475 53 0-2 2.300 61 3-5 3.125
45 0-2 1.500 53 3-5 2.325 61 6-8 3.150
45 3-5 1.525 53 6-8 2.350 61 9-11 3.175
45 6-8 1.550 53 9-11 2.375 62 0-2 3.200
45 9-11 1.575 54 0-2 2.400 62 3-5 3.225
46 0-2 1.600 54 3-5 2.425 62 6-8 3.250
46 3-5 1.625 54 6-8 2.450 62 9-11 3.275
46 6-8 1.650 54 9-11 2.475 63 0-2 3.300
46 9-11 1.675 55 0-2 2.500 63 3-5 3.325
47 0-2 1.700 55 3-5 2.525 63 6-8 3.350
47 3-5 1.725 55 6-8 2.550 63 9-11 3.375
47 6-8 1.750 55 9-11 2.575 64 0-2 3.400
47 9-11 1.775 56 0-2 2.600 64 3-5 3.425
48 0-2 1.800 56 3-5 2.625 64 6-8 3.450
48 3-5 1.825 56 6-8 2.650 64 9-11 3.475
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APPENDIX B. RIF NOTIFICATION
From: Commanding Officer, Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Oakland
To:
Subj: CERTIFICATE OF EXPECTED SEPARATION
Ref: (a) DoD CPMS-AAW ltr dtd 16 September 1996
Encl: (1) Early Priority Placement Program Registration Form
1
.
As you are aware, the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Oakland was
identified for closure under the Base Realignment and Closure 1995 decisions. In
response to this mandate, FISC Oakland is faced with implementing a phased drawdown
of its civilian workforce toward closure. The current Most Efficient Organization (MEO)
date 28 June 1 996, details FISC Oakland's drawdown plans and you may face a reduction-
in-force (RIF).
2. To minimize the need for RTF, reference (a) has authorized FISC Oakland approval for
the two year early Priority Placement Program (PPP) registration to those employees
expected to be separated by REF on or before 30 September 1998. Because I would like
to provide every opportunity to employees who may be separated, I have requested that a
mock RTF be conducted to determine those employees who would be adversely affected.
Regretfully, you were identified as an employee to be separated. At least 120 to 60 days
before the RIF action will affect you, you will receive a specific RIF notice giving you
information on the determinations made concerning your position, your retention standing
and benefits and programs available to you.
3. This letter authorizes you early registration into the PPP. The Human Resources
Office (HRO) will schedule briefings to provide you with the information you need
regarding early registration. Other programs for which you qualify are as follows:
- DoD PPP. this certificate allows you to register in the DoD PPP, ifyou are not
already registered. The DoD PPP gives you mandatory placement in vacancies which
match your skills and grade levels, at DoD locations for which you register, early
registration is voluntary. Please indicate on enclosure (1) ifyou would like to register in
the PPP at this time. Return enclosure (1) to at the FISC HRO Site Office,
Bldg 321-1, 1st floor, by close of business 04 October 1996.
- DoD Reemployment Priority List (RPL). Because you have received this
certificate, you can register fir the RPL. registering gives you priority reemployment
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consideration for DoD jobs within your commuting area over certain non-DoD job
applicants.
- Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). The U.S. Department ofLabor provides
funding through the state for employees like you who may be facing separation, various
types of retraining and readjustment assistance such as counseling, testing, placement
assistance, support services and financial counseling are available to you. You will need
to take this letter to your local Employment Development Department (EDD) Office and
inquire about registration into the program.
4. Please remember this is not a reflection on your performance or conduct, but is
necessitated solely by the need to reduce the workforce due to base closure. I realize this
action will have a major impact on you life and future, and I can assure help and assistance
will be provided. Ifyou have any questions, please contact at





Subj NOTICE OF SEPARATION BY REDUCTION-IN-FORCE (RTF)
Ref: (a)5CFR351
End: (1) DoD Program for Stability of Civilian Employment
1. Under Base Realignment and Closure 1995 (BRAC 95) decisions, the Fleet and
Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Oakland was identified for closure. In response to this
mandate, FISC Oakland is faced with implementing a phased draw-down of its civilian
workforce toward closure. This action warrants the necessity to conduct a RIF.
Regretfully, you will be released from your competitive level, and will be separated from
the rolls effective 1 1 April 1997.
2. The following information concerning your retention preference is as follows:
Current Position Title: Lead Transportation Assistant (OA)
Pay Plan/Series/Grade: GS-2 1 02-6
Competitive Level: AAH6
Retention Subgroup: IB
Service Computation Date: 3-16-88
Annual Service Computation Date: 30 June 96 - Level 5
30 June 95 - Level 5
30 June 94 - Level 4
Adjusted Service Computation: 3-16-69
3. Any questions you may have concerning this action should be directed to
who will assist you in every possible way. retention registers
and pertinent regulations are available for your review at the Human resources Site
Office, Building 321-1C, FISC Oakland. If after examination of the retention registers
and pertinent regulations, you feel that any of your rights have been violated, you have
the right to grieve this separation action through the negotiated grievance procedure.
Your grievance must be submitted in writing to the Human Resources Site Office
within fifteen (15) working days from the effective date of this RJJF action in
accordance with Article XXVIII of the negotiated agreement.
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4. You have the option of pursuing this matter either through the negotiated grievance
procedure or with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), San Francisco
Regional Office, 250 Montgomery Street, Suite 400, San Francisco. CA 94104, if you
believe this action is based on unlawful discrimination under 5 USC Section 2302 (B)
(1). Your appeal to the MSPB must be in writing and filed no later than 30 calendar
days after the effective date of this action. Enclosure (1) contains information
regarding the MSPB appeal procedures and appeal form.
5. As a career/career-conditional employee you may be entitled to the following:
a. To be registered in the Reemployment Priority List, and the Department of
Defense Priority Placement Program (PPP) as described in enclosure (1).
b. Although no offer of continuous employment can be made at this time,
placement efforts will continue and you will be advised of any offer for continued
employment by separate notice. If placement is not possible, you will be
separated on the effective date specified in paragraph 1 above. You will continue
in a duty status in your present position during this notice period. Ifyou are
separated, you may be entitled to severance pay under the provisions outlined in
enclosure (1) and reference (a) and you will receive a lump-sum payment for
unused annual leave to your credit. Enclosure (1) also contains pertinent
information on placement assistance programs, retirement, life and health
insurance, leave, pay, and unemployment compensation.
6. This action is not a reflection on your performance or conduct, but is necessitated
solely by the need to reduce the workforce due to budget constraints. I realize this
action will have a major impact on your life and future, and I can assure you help and
assistance will be provided. I have sincerely appreciated the service you have rendered




1. The Academy of Political Science Proceedings, Vol. 36, No. 3, Prospects for
Privatization . Ed., Steve H. Hanke, New York, 1987.
2. Office ofManagement and Budget, Circular No. A-76, March 1996.
3. Hearings Before the Committee on the Budget House of Representatives, One
Hundred Fourth Congress, March 1, 1996, Serial No. 104-6.
4. Fitzgerald, Randall, When Government Goes Private, Universe Books, New York,
1988.
5. General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Committee, OMB Circular A-76
Legislation Has Curbed Many Cost Studies in the Military Services, July 1991.
6. General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Committee, Federal Productivity




Title 5 Code of Federal Regulations 351.201(a)(2).
8. Labor-Management Relations Implications of Reduction in Force and Reengineering,
United States Office of Personnel Management, March 1996.
9. Title 5 United States Code Subsection 7 1 06 (a)(2).
10. Title 5 Code of Federal Regulations 351 .802 (a)(l)-(6); Title 5 United States Code
3502 (d)(2)(A)-(E).




Title 5 Code of Federal Regulations 351.403 (a).
13. Title 5 Code ofFederal Regulations 351.504 (b)(2).
14. Title 5 Code of Federal Regulations 35 1 .504 (b)(3).
15. Title 5 Code of Federal Regulations 351.504 (d)(l)-(3).
67






Defense Technical Information Center 2
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218




3. Prof. William R. Gates (Code SM/Gt) 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5103
4. CDR Jim Kerber (Code SM/Ke) 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5103







3 2768 00337715 1
